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CONTRACTS TO COMMUNITIES: A PROCESSUAL MODEL OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL VIRTUE 
 
Abstract 
In the face of systemic challenges to corporate legitimacy, scholars and managers alike have 
been rethinking traditional answers to the question: What does it take to be a good company? 
We approach this question in two novel ways. We offer a normative answer, grounded in 
virtue ethics, by introducing a threefold typology of organizational forms. The moral 
goodness of each form depends on the congruence between its purpose and virtues. But we 
also offer a positive answer in the form of a processual model which traces corporate 
goodness to its empirical antecedents and consequences. The model defies a view of 
organizations as innately good or evil, but rather portrays virtue as the sediment of a value 
infusion process. We predict that if managers succeed in establishing in their organizations 
the kind of virtues necessary to support collective moral agency, they can expect to reap gains 
like enhanced effectiveness and legitimacy. However, when they neglect their moral 
responsibilities, the result will likely be organizational demise. 
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POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE VIEWS OF ‘GOODNESS’ 
 
Since the collapse of Enron in 2001, a wave of scandals has ravaged the corporate world and 
fundamentally shaken investors’ confidence in financial markets. Some of the implicated 
companies include Tyco (U.S.), WorldCom (U.S.), Sumitomo Corp. (Japan), Parmalat (Italy), 
and Ahold (the Netherlands). That the recent scandals eroded billions of dollars of 
shareholder value, and that corporate representatives have been imprisoned for white collar 
fraud is nothing new. What is both novel and deeply disturbing about the latest incidents is 
that they happened to those of whom we least expected it. They did not happen to notorious 
laggards, but to companies that outperformed virtually all others in their respective industries. 
They did not happen on the watch of CEOs with prior stains and smears, but in companies led 
by the best and brightest representatives of the managerial profession. They also did not hit 
companies lacking innovative potential, but instead those with the smartest business models. 
These scandals thus force us to rethink our traditional answers to the question: What does it 
take to be a good company? 
 Many have proposed that the answer to this question must be grounded in (business) 
ethics, as the scandals have illustrated the bankruptcy of amoral business models that have 
gone too far in relaxing moral constraints in the pursuit of profit. Especially virtue ethics is 
proposed as a promising foundation for new definitions of corporate goodness (Heugens et al., 
2006; Moore, 2005; Solomon, 2003; Weaver, 2006), because of the perspective’s superior fit 
with the field of management studies. This fit manifests itself in three ways. First, virtue 
ethics is an ethics of aspiration, as it reflects on actors’ ambitions to excel in what they were 
meant to do (MacIntyre, 1985; Moore and Beadle, 2006; Pence, 1991). This coheres with a 
field that teaches managers to pursue objectives derived from the corporate mission. Second, 
virtues have historically been defined as skills (Bloomfield, 2000). In the Gorgias, one of the 
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early Platonic dialogues, Socrates argues that the moral virtues of courage, temperance, 
wisdom, and justice are skills, which are to be learned in ways similar to how one would 
master the skills of medicine and navigation. This view is congruent with a portrayal of 
organizations as repositories of skills and capabilities. Third, virtue ethics is moderately 
communitarian (Etzioni, 1996), in that it recognizes the virtues of common pursuit (Sherman, 
1993) and acknowledges that collective actors can themselves be the bearer of virtues 
(Tomasi, 1991), without thereby denying the responsibilities of individual human beings. This 
view is amicable to a field in which it is argued that theories of organizations have to be micro 
founded “in the sense that they must involve, or at least be consistent with a story of what 
agents do and why they do it” (Dosi 1997: 1531). In sum, in terms of its congruence with the 
field of management studies, virtue ethics appears to be superior to other ethical theories, 
especially to those that are staunchly individualistic (like utilitarianism) or that forbid certain 
means for the pursuit of economic ends (like Kantian ethics). 
 In spite of its promise, virtue ethics’ impact on the field of management studies is 
rather modest. Granted, it is one of the ‘centers of gravity’ in business ethics (Heugens et al., 
2006), but even business ethicists rarely explore how their conceptions of corporate goodness 
touch upon the type of phenomena that matter most to management scholars, such as 
organizational legitimacy and survival. This is a worrisome conclusion, because the question 
concerning corporate goodness demands a double answer. It obviously demands a normative 
answer, as one of the interpretations of “goodness” is “moral goodness.” Such an answer 
revolves around the discovery of the moral goodness of certain organizational types, and this 
has long been the primary occupation of virtue ethicists (e.g., Moore, 2005; Moore and 
Beadle, 2006; Solomon, 2004; Weaver, 2006). But it also demands a positive answer, one that 
traces virtues to their antecedents and connects them with meaningful outcomes. It is here that 
business ethicists usually remain silent. We therefore aspire to say something more about the 
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qualities of virtue ethics as a normative and positive theory of organizational goodness. This 
ambition can only be realized by integrating virtue theory with management theories. The 
‘double yield’ of our integrative efforts includes a normative view of virtuous organizations, 
but also a positive view of the process by which organizational virtue becomes 
institutionalized and converted into tangible outcomes. 
 
NORMATIVELY ‘GOOD’ ORGANIZATIONS: A TYPOLOGY 
 
It is impossible to understand virtue theory without exploring its intellectual roots. These can 
be traced to Platonic works like the Gorgias, the Meno, the Philebus, and the Republic and, 
most importantly, to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (NE). The core premises of virtue ethics 
can easily be summed up. Virtue ethics is often described as the ethics of character (Moore, 
2005), and the central question it seeks to answer is therefore not “which moral laws must be 
obeyed under all circumstances?” (Kantian ethics) or “how can we bring about the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number?” (utilitarian ethics), but “who should I aspire to be as a 
person?” or “what should we aspire to be as an organization?” The objective of the approach 
is not to write the decision-algorithm for the behaviorally perfect ethical robot (Pence, 1991), 
but to understand how the character of the acting individual or organization is shaped by its 
social context, which is partially self-enacted through prior choices (MacIntyre, 1985). 
Such a contextualized ethics leaves little room for moral universals. Especially in 
business, “audacity becomes the merchant but not the banker, creativity the designer but not 
the accountant, and impartiality the mediator but not the attorney” (Heugens et al., 2006: p. 
401). So what to take as an Archimedean point from which to deduce the relevant virtues for a 
given organization? The answer is provided by Aristotle, who observes that “Every art and 
every investigation, and similarly every action and pursuit, is considered to aim at some 
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good” (NE 1094a).1 Each individual is born or socialized (and each organization founded) for 
the pursuit of a specific goal or telos. This telos holds the key to deciphering the relevant set 
of virtues an actor must possess. Specifically, desirable virtues are those allowing an actor to 
excel in “any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity” 
(MacIntyre, 1985: 187) to which it is called by tradition, duty, or ambition. Relevant virtues 
are therefore determined by the goals an actor means to pursue. 
So what does it take to be a good company? A contextualized ethics like virtue theory 
cannot produce a universal answer to this question, since the relevant set of virtues for a given 
organization is determined by its telos. But we ought not commit to ethical relativism, which 
holds that there can be no normative common ground across organizations at all, since virtues 
are always specific to individual cases. Instead, we will develop a Mertonian-style theory of 
the middle range, a new representative of a broader class of “theories that lie between the 
minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day 
research; and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain 
all the observed uniformities of social behavior, social organization and social change” 
(Merton, 1968: 39). Specifically, we develop a three-pronged typology of organizations, 
grouped in terms of their teloi. Our objective is to create sufficient intra-type homogeneity (to 
escape relativism), complemented by adequate inter-type heterogeneity (to avoid 
universalism), in order to enable purposeful reflection on class-specific ethical virtues. The 
three organizational types we discuss here are: (1) the nexus-of-contracts organization, (2) the 
utilitarian organization, and (3) the moral community.2
 
The Nexus-of-Contracts Organization 
The nexus-of-contracts organization was first discussed by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). It is best seen as a legal entity that serves as a focal point for a 
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complex set of written and unwritten contracts amongst disparate organizational participants. 
The marvel of this organizational type is that it supplants the multilateral contracts between 
the many parties one typically finds in markets with a system in which the interactions 
between cooperating agents are structured as unilateral contracts with the legal entity. 
According to Zingales (2000), the nexus-of-contracts firm does not really exist as a separate 
actor, but is instead a largely fictitious creature, which serves as a convenient “shorthand 
notation” for the underlying set of contracts. This view closely matches Alchian and Demsetz’ 
(1972) original conceptualization, who observed that the firm: 
 
“has no power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree 
from ordinary market contracting between any two people (…) [The firm] can fire or sue, just 
as I can fire my grocer by stopping purchases from him, or sue him for delivering faulty 
products” (p. 777). 
 
 According to this view, the behavior of the legally fictitious organization represents 
the equilibrium-seeking behavior of a complex contractual system, through which dissimilarly 
endowed and motivated contractual agents clear their differences. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) offer a slightly more socialized view of the nexus-of-contracts organization. In their 
interpretation the organization remains a vehicle by which individuals can pursue their private 
interests, and its raison d’être still is that it saves transaction costs, such that individuals can 
reach their goals with less effort or expense. But it is also a regulatory institution that codifies 
a number of critical ‘rules of the game’ (Jensen, 1983: 326). It specifies (a) a performance 
evaluation system and (b) a reward system, and (c) it allocates decision rights. These systems 
facilitate cooperative interactions between organizational participants by preventing an 
opportunism-prone minority to pursue its self-interest ‘with guile’ at the expense of the 
collective (cf. Williamson, 1985). Nexus-of-contracts organizations are thus more than legal 
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fictions, because the repositories of decision rules they harbor for policing opportunists are 
not easily found in markets (Heugens, 2005). 
 Since individuals join a nexus-of-contracts organization to advance their own good, 
the teloi of such organizations revolve around individual utility maximization, and the locus 
of these teloi are the individual members (see Table 1). This notion is consistent with the view 
that nexus-of-contracts organizations can simultaneously serve many disparate interests by 
serving as an ingenious clearing system, allowing individuals to merely focus on the material 
interests they have in common, and declare all other features of their trading partners 
irrelevant for the exchange at hand (Heugens and van Oosterhout, 2002). Nexus-of-contracts 
organizations are thus a-moral creatures. This does not imply that morality has no place in 
such organizations, but to the extent that they harbor virtues, these are located at the level of 
the individual organizational participants. In other words, corporate goodness in this breed of 
organizations is not a form of collective goodness, but merely the sum of virtues contained in 
the corporation’s members. Corporate goodness is thus critically dependent on what comes to 
participants’ minds about being good to others and being good to themselves. This “good” can 
be virtue. Members’ repeated interactions with other organizational participants give salience 
to the notion of mutual identity, and thus urge them to give up the agent neutrality that is 
foundational to utilitarian or Kantian ethics (van Oosterhout et al., 2006). But the scope of 
these virtues is limited. As Sherman (1993: 278) puts it: “Treating self and others with 
decency, and justice understood broadly, might seem to exhaust the moral sphere.”  
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
Like everything else about nexus-of-contracts organizations, their goodness is fragile. 
These organizations are built on the associative principle of accommodation (Pettit, 1993: 
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299), which states that organizational participants do not join the organization because they 
perceive any inherent attraction in cooperating, but merely because their association offers 
them the best possible deal given the circumstances (see Table 1). It is not that nexus-of-
contracts organizations may not harbor appealing constellations of virtue, but the problem 
from an organizational morality perspective is that these constellations are not durably 
institutionalized. When more attractive outside options present themselves to some 
participants, the sum of corporate goodness will change as a result of turnover. Moreover, if 
the organization is subjected to crowding processes (Frey, 1998), whereby morally developed 
agents leave the organization first, the sum of moral qualities of the organization diminishes. 
 
The Utilitarian Organization 
The second organizational type we distinguish here is referred to by Etzioni as the utilitarian 
organization. Social units captured by this term are “organizations in which remuneration is 
the major means of control over lower participants and calculative involvement (i.e., mild 
alienation to mild commitment) characterizes the orientation of the large majority of lower 
participants” (Etzioni, 1975: 31). Although some degree of continuity exists between nexus-
of-contracts and utilitarian organizations, the differences between them are more substantial. 
Importantly, utilitarian organizations are founded on a different principle of association, 
notably: the principle of compromise (Pettit, 1993: 299; see Table 1). Here the parties are 
induced to approve of certain moral or amoral principles of organization. These principles are 
not commonly recognized as inherently attractive, as each organizational member approves of 
them for varying sets of reasons, but at least the value of joint action and of the principles that 
ought to govern it are recognized by all. We illustrate below how this respect for joint purpose 
translates into a different conception of organizational goodness. 
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 Since the notion of virtue is contingent upon telos, we first describe how the 
organizational telos is uncovered in utilitarian organizations. The process of contracting into 
the utilitarian firm sets the conditions under which some form of corporate purpose or telos 
can emerge endogenously from the complex of strategic decisions made by the contractors 
(cf. Aoki, 2001). In each nascent organization there are typically a number of different 
cooperative solutions, which are all more or less acceptable to all parties involved (Sugden, 
1989). Contractors therefore face a so-called coordination game (cf. Lewis, 1969), which 
centers on selecting a particular solution from this broader set. The standard apparatus of 
game theory teaches us that what is needed here is a “salient solution” or a “focal point” that 
helps contractors coordinate their efforts (Lewis, 1969). This solution, which Aoki (2001) 
calls a “shared-beliefs cum summary-equilibrium,” emerges during the process of contracting 
into the utilitarian firm, because rational contractors will not just consider what is in it for 
them individually but also reflect on what ends are achievable collectively. Coordination 
problems are thus resolved when decision makers rationally adjust their behavior to the 
choices other decision makers have made in the past or are likely to make in the future. This 
process is wholly endogenous, in that it does not rely on extra-organizational information cues 
or enforcing mechanisms to come about (Aoki, 2001). Corporate purpose in utilitarian 
organizations is therefore best conceived as an emergent collective property of the practice of 
contracting into the firm, given the restrictions imposed on this process by the reasons other 
contracting parties have for joining the cooperation (Heugens et al., 2006).  
Which conception of corporate goodness fits the utilitarian organization best? As 
utilitarian organizations are oriented towards a collective goal, the traditional self/other 
distinction that features so prominently in conceptions of person-oriented ethics no longer 
holds (see Table 1). In addition to caring about self and others, members of a “good” 
utilitarian organization must also appreciate the fact that they act and decide together. This 
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calls for so-called virtues of common pursuit. In the words of one contributor: “Apart from 
the particular activities and products that may define a species of community, we value doing 
things with others (…) A willingness to compromise, to seek consensus, to be trustworthy and 
fair, all go with valuing collective endeavor. Similarly, loyalty to worthwhile, collective goals 
can be morally virtuous” (Sherman, 1993: 278).  
This distinction between self- and other-directed virtues on the one hand, and the 
virtues of common pursuit on the other, dates back to Aristotle. From the NE, most will 
remember the list of self- and other-directed virtues: courage, temperance, liberality, 
magnificence, magnanimity, etc. But two of the ten books of the NE deal with the virtues of 
affiliation (philia; Books VIII and IX). In these books, one of the most famous Aristotelian 
dictums (“Humans are by nature social, for even when they have no need of assistance from 
one another, they still desire to live together” Politics 1278b) is put to work. It is 
demonstrated that the achievement of greater happiness for all requires all collaborants to 
recognize the value of their joint pursuit, and muster their individual excellences towards a 
collective goal. As voiced in IX.8: “If all were to strive (hamillōmenōn) towards what is fine 
and strain every nerve to do the finest deeds, everything would be as it should be for the 
common weal” (NE 1169a). In sum, to realize a collective telos, a utilitarian organization 
should harbor sufficient virtues of collective pursuit to induce all individual participants to 
gather their individual excellences behind its collective ambitions. 
Yet, even though the virtues of collective pursuit are geared towards collective 
purposes, they are still nested in the individual organizational participants. Granted, the 
virtues are partially institutionalized in that they are shared amongst participants through joint 
action and communication, which makes the utilitarian organization somewhat more resilient 
than the nexus-of-contracts organization. But institutionalization of the virtues is only partial 
precisely because they are only shared amongst the present participants. They are not 
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enduringly engraved in some extra-personal organizational system like a virtuous climate or 
culture. This makes utilitarian organizations vulnerable to turnover. Individual members may 
not leave the organization immediately in case a marginally better outside option comes along 
because of their endorsement of the collective purpose, but when turnover does occur, part of 
the organization’s stock of virtues literally walks out the door. Unless the departed members 
can rapidly be replaced with other participants willing to endorse the collective telos, the 
organization will see its sum of moral qualities diminish. 
 
The Moral Community 
A third organizational type is the moral community. We treat moral communities as collective 
actors, in that they are higher-order agents, who can be the bearer of properties that cannot be 
reduced to the properties of lower-order participants (Etzioni, 1968; Laumann and Marsden, 
1979). Some debate exists as to whether collective actors can be moral actors in their own 
right. Velasquez (2003), for example, rejects the notion of collective moral agency: “The fact 
that a collection of entities has properties that cannot be attributed to any of its members, does 
not show that the collection is a distinct real individual identity” (p. 541). But Velasquez 
rejects the possibility of collective moral agency on the wrong grounds. The question is not 
whether organizations must or must not be seen as entities with independent ontological 
status, as this is not a necessary condition for moral agency. The question is simply whether 
organizations can collectively possess the type of properties that are necessary and sufficient 
conditions for collective moral agency – irrespective of their ontological status.3  
In general, three properties must be present in organizations before we can speak of 
them as moral communities (Heugens et al., 2006; van Oosterhout et al., 2006). It is best to 
see these properties as boundary conditions to collective moral agency; if any of them is 
transgressed, the moral community regresses towards a utilitarian organization. The first 
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boundary condition is that organizations must collectively be autonomous to bind themselves 
to a set of self-imposed moral constraints (Rawls, 1971). Autonomy is relevant because it 
allows organizations to make promises that fully reflect their telos. According to Rawls 
(1971), autonomy guarantees that parties “are acting from principles that they would 
acknowledge under conditions that best express their nature as free and equal beings” (p. 
515). Autonomy is thus a necessary precondition for collective moral agency.  
Second, to realize a collective telos, the interests of organizational constituents must to 
a certain extent be morally and materially alignable. Collective moral actors must find a way 
to withstand the centrifugal force of self-motivated behavior, which allows private morals to 
prevail over collective morals. This primacy of private morals can easily erode a collective 
moral actor’s ability to work towards collective goals. To overcome this predicament, moral 
communities need more than an endogenously discovered common focal point. On top of this 
common goal, they must have an incentive structure or administrative system in place that is 
robust against at least minor defections (Sugden, 1989). In moral communities, the shared-
beliefs cum summary-equilibrium is thus stiffened by structures and systems that make the 
attainment of individual goals dependent on the attainment of collective goals.  
Third, organizations must have the ability to abide by the promises they make. Due to 
the telos-dependent nature of organizational virtues, it is impossible to substantively denote 
what the virtues of organizations in general ought to be (Heugens et al., 2006). As 
autonomous creatures, moral communities have the structural capacity to commit themselves 
to virtually anything. This does not make their relevant set of virtues empty or indeterminate, 
however. To be capable of collective moral agency, organizations must possess that precise 
set of skills that allows them to realize their self-selected telos (MacIntyre, 1985). Without 
these, organizations would repeatedly be forced to go against their own principles or break 
their promises, thus proving themselves incapable of collective moral agency. Although it is 
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impossible to denote a generic set of substantive virtues that all organizations must possess, it 
is therefore at least theoretically possible to identify a set of specific virtues for each 
individual organization, provided that we know its telos. 
If these boundary conditions are met, organizations can in principle evolve into moral 
communities. Whether this will happen is contingent upon a set of organizational and 
managerial factors, which we discuss in a following section. What binds such communities 
together is that they act according to the associative principle of shared reasons (Pettit, 1993: 
299). At their heart lies a set of “rules for the general regulation of behavior which no one 
could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement” (Scanlon, 1982: 
110). These rules are endorsed by all participants in the community, on the basis that they 
have certain universal and intrinsic attractions. This contrasts with the operating logic of the 
utilitarian organization, wherein all participants abide by organizational principles for private 
and extrinsic reasons. It contrasts even sharper with the associative principle of the nexus-of-
contracts organization, in which no constitutive principles are shared at all. When a given 
community possesses intrinsically valuable principles, it has become “infused with value 
beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand” (Selznick, 1957: 17). Its telos no 
longer hinges on the realization of extrinsic benefits, but has become endogenized. It may 
even consist of the thriving and prolongation of the moral community itself (see Table 1). 
What makes moral communities resilient is that they are fully institutionalized 
collective actors. They are unique in that they meet a number of boundary conditions to 
collective moral agency that are not met by the other organizational types. Qualities like 
autonomy, alignability, and ability have a high degree of social facticity to them. Such 
emergent properties materialize as rules, traditions, or conventions out of the repeated social 
interactions in a group of social actors (Weick, 1979). These focal points are resilient 
precisely because they are detached from the individual community members that once 
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created them through their dealings with others, making them robust against turnover. In fact, 
the most likely cause of failure in moral communities is a slow decay of the social fabric that 
binds them together through the deinstitutionalization of these shared virtues (Oliver, 1992).  
 
Normatively “Good” Organizations 
So when is an organization morally good? It is tempting to proclaim the moral community a 
“better” organizational type than the utilitarian organization or the nexus-of-contracts, but this 
conclusion seems philosophically unwarranted. What matters in virtue ethics is the degree of 
congruence between the telos a given organization pursues and the set of virtues it harbors. 
All three organizational types can be congruent or incongruent in this sense. Hence, the nexus 
of contracts organization, which strives towards individual utility maximization, is morally 
good to the extent that all its members possess adequate self- and other-regarding virtues (see 
Table 1), but is morally underdeveloped in case its members lack these virtues. Similarly, the 
utilitarian organization, which strives towards collective utility maximization, is morally good 
to the extent that all its members possess the skills to recognize and realize the value of 
common pursuit (see Table 1), but lacks in moral development in case a fraction of its 
membership is exclusively concerned with their private interests. Finally, the moral 
community, which strives towards self-selected collective goals, is morally good when it 
meets the boundary criteria for collective moral agency (see Table 1), but is lacking in moral 
development in case it fails to meet them. Two conclusions about this typology seem 
warranted. First, it does not imply a rank-ordering in terms of moral goodness amongst the 
three organizational types. All three can be equally good, provided that their virtues match 
their telos. Second, not all real life organizations are morally good, in that many experience 
purpose-virtue incongruency. The thesis we develop below is that such organizations are not 
only prone to moral defects, but also to illegitimacy and organizational failure. 
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A PROCESSUAL MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL ‘GOODNESS’ 
 
Whereas organizational goodness can manifest itself in all organizational types, it is relatively 
robust in the moral community, more fragile in utilitarian organizations, and frighteningly 
frail in the nexus of contracts. Our goal is to explain in a positive sense why the resilience of 
goodness varies across organizational types. To that effect we introduce a processual model, 
showing how the three organizational types are connected and how social collectives can 
develop from one type into another. At the core of our model lies the assumption that there is 
nothing inevitable about this developmental process, and that each transition phase is 
contingent upon managerial agency. Managers are not automatons, and they have to decide 
for themselves in each individual case whether they are willing to put their weight behind an 
organizational transition. The dynamism in our model thus primarily derives from managers’ 
motivations, and only to a lesser extent from exogenous forces. Even though our graphical 
display seems to resemble a self-propelling process, we explicitly wish to avoid any reference 
to an inevitable evolutionary process (see Figure 1).  
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
The contributions of this model are threefold. First, it offers a positive theory of 
organizational goodness in that it introduces a developmental perspective on organizational 
virtue, tracing goodness to its empirical antecedents and consequences. Few virtue ethicists 
attempt to connect virtue theory with positive theorizing, and to the best of our knowledge, no 
processual model of the development of organizational virtue is available to date. A second 
contribution of is that the model is grounded in the literature on management and 
organization, which establishes a new level of connectivity between virtue ethics on the one 
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hand and established organizational theories on the other. The model is in its entirety related 
to organizational institutionalization theories (the “old” institutionalism; cf. DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991: 11-15). Elements of the model are nested in other perspectives on management 
and organization, such as imprinting theory (Stinchcombe, 1965) and organizational 
legitimacy theory (the “new” institutionalism; cf. DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 11-27), as well 
as the upper echelon perspective (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) and the strategic middle 
management perspective (Floyd and Lane, 2000; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992). A third 
contribution is that the model unifies several connotations of organizational goodness. 
Precisely, the model explicates the conditions under which “moral goodness” will lead to 
“practical excellence.” As such, the model offers a fresh perspective on our research question. 
 
The Dawn of Virtue: From Nexus-of-Contracts to Utilitarian Organization 
Nexus-of-contracts organizations emerge when two or more contractors jointly decide that it 
is in their best interest to structure their future transactions via a formal organization rather 
than through the market. Many different reasons can lead them to this conclusion. One of 
these is that integration might end socially destructive haggling over “appropriable quasi-
rents” (Klein et al., 1978) which stem from asset-specific investments. As Williamson puts it: 
“fiat is frequently a more efficient way to settle minor conflicts (…) than is haggling” (1971: 
114-115). For as long as their investments in dedicated assets remain a potential source of 
private pecuniary gain to their counterparts, contractors will be better off when they pool 
these assets in a joint organization, coordinated by a “boss” who is authorized to “cut the 
Gordian knots” of decision-making (Perrow, 1986: 25). Another reason favoring integration is 
that adaptation to unforeseen circumstances is difficult in markets where uncertainty abounds 
(Simon, 1951). The contractors must choose between (a) negotiating a market exchange 
contract before the uncertainty about the future situation is resolved or (b) allocating authority 
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to a “boss,” who can then make an adaptive decision after the uncertainty has cleared up. The 
more the value of a given transaction is contingent upon post-hoc adaptation, the more 
attractive the internalization option becomes (Klein, 2000). These observations point out that 
the most central agent in any nascent firm’s virtue institutionalization process is likely to be 
its first top manager or the founding top management team. See Proposition 1: 
 
Proposition 1: Nexus-of-contracts organizations emerge when two or more prospective 
contractors appoint an ultimate authority to protect their dedicated investments or 
avoid the problem of adaptation. 
 
In economic theories of the firm, all parties in the nexus-of-contracts are drones in that 
they are purportedly guided by a general model of self-interested action that makes them both 
(a) completely predictable and (b) perfectly interchangeable (Bowles and Gintis, 1993). We 
have advocated a more socialized version of the nexus-of-contracts, by allowing its 
constituent contractors to be the carrier of self- and other-regarding virtues (see Table 1). We 
now further socialize the nexus-of-contracts organization by allowing its ultimate authority a 
distinctive identity. Prior studies have shown that the identity of the founder/top manager is 
likely to spill over to the identity of the organization through imprinting, “a process in which 
events occurring at certain key developmental stages have persisting—perhaps lifelong—
consequences” (Hannan, 1998: 132) for the organization. Imprinting is contingent upon the 
identity of the founder/top manager, as founders build organizations that not only fit 
historically specific environments, but also cohere with their personal ambitions and life 
philosophies (Stinchcombe, 1965). Top managers thus play a leading role in the development 
of a firm from a nexus-of-contracts to a utilitarian organization. If they envisage a collective 
purpose for the organization, it is usually within their power to impose this vision on the core 
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group of founding contractors (Schein, 2004). Similarly, leaders can over time instill the 
virtues of common pursuit in their organizations through socialization and selective 
recruitment and dismissal (Schein, 2004). See Proposition 2: 
 
Proposition 2: Nexus-of-contracts organizations develop into utilitarian organizations 
when top managers succeed at infusing the organization with a sense of collective 
purpose and its members with the virtues of common pursuit. 
 
 Not all top managers make it a priority to spur the development of the nexus-of-
contracts organization into a utilitarian organization. Some may see their organizations 
primarily as vehicles for furthering their private interests – a view that certainly underlies 
most of the present-day literature on corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Self-
interested managerial behavior fundamentally affects the organizational climate, even when 
no malevolence is involved. Such behaviors have a tendency of crowding out what Frey 
(1997) calls “civic virtues” and what we have called the “virtues of common pursuit.” The 
hidden cost of running an organization for personal gain is that it can alter the intrinsic 
motivation of other participants. Specifically, participants’ interests in furthering a collective 
purpose will diminish when top managers refrain from stressing its importance. This effect 
increases when the interaction between leader and participant is greater, as the template of 
egoism then gains greater influence on the latter (Frey, 1997, 1998). This crowding effect 
coalesces with the fact that nexus-of-contracts organizations are ‘hardwired’ for 
straightforward dissolution. The nexus’ temporary equilibrium will persist only for as long as 
all members see it as their first-best chance of realizing their private interests. If members find 
that they are better off joining another nexus, they will simply leave. See Proposition 3: 
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Proposition 3: If top managers persistently crowd out any emerging sense of collective 
purpose or the virtues of common pursuit, nexus-of-contracts organizations will be 
dismantled as soon as the value of an outside option exceeds that of prolonged 
membership for nontrivial contractors. 
 
Passing the Baton: From Utilitarian Organization to Moral Community 
If top managers want to see their organizations develop from utilitarian organizations to moral 
communities, they have to rethink their internal structures and control systems. In utilitarian 
organizations, the role of middle managers is traditionally modeled after the “command and 
control” perspective, in which their primary responsibilities are implementing leaders’ visions 
and supplying them with information synthesized from lower organizational levels (Floyd and 
Lane, 2000; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992). Since decision-making powers are concentrated at 
the top, there is little room in such organizations for what Westley (1990) calls “strategic 
conversations” – communications between senior and middle-level management that precede, 
accompany, and follow actual strategy decisions. Such narrow conceptions of the role of 
middle managers fail to stimulate the development of a moral community for two reasons. 
First, the importance of substantive organizational virtues – like carefulness or audacity, 
temperance or aggression – differs across business contexts. Different virtue constellations 
may durably co-exist in a single organization, which makes it undesirable to have them 
centrally ordained from a strategic apex. Second, developing the type of collective telos-
specific virtues that characterize the moral community requires substantive interaction 
between top and middle managers about strategic issues. The effect of virtuous behavior by 
top leaders is likely to be annulled when local leaders are excluded from the strategic 
conversations in which organizational goals are set and individual standards of behavior are 
expressed. To stimulate the development of moral communities, top managers must involve 
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middle managers in the conversations that give organizations strategic direction. This requires 
investments in systems allowing middle managers to converse cross-functionally around 
strategic issues (Westley, 1990: 349). See Proposition 4: 
 
Proposition 4: The development of utilitarian organizations into moral communities 
requires that top managers share the responsibility for the development of a collective 
telos and collective virtues with middle managers. 
 
Middle managers play an important role as agents of change in the development from 
utilitarian organization to moral community. They decide whether organizations meet the 
boundary conditions for collective moral agency. In terms of autonomy, the crucial matter is 
whether middle managers capitalize on the delegation of responsibility for the development of 
a collective telos and collective virtues by top managers (cf. Proposition 4). If they embrace 
their new responsibilities, they can make the organization capable of committing collectively 
to a self-selected telos. With respect to alignability, middle managers play an equally 
important role. The problem of organizational governance is often simplistically portrayed as 
the problem of keeping top managers in check on behalf of shareholders (cf. Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). But agency problems exist at all levels of the organization. If middle managers 
are willing to put their weight behind organizational systems that address noncompliance, 
these lower-level agency problems can fruitfully be addressed. Finally, in terms of ability, 
organizational virtues are best conceptualized as a set of organizational skills. It is therefore 
not surprising that middle managers, who play a crucial role in the development of a firm’s 
competitive potential through the definition, deployment, and modification of its competitive 
capabilities (Floyd and Lane, 2000), also play a central role in the development of its moral 
virtues. See Proposition 5: 
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Proposition 5: Utilitarian organizations develop into moral communities when middle 
managers successfully help the organization meet the boundary conditions for 
collective moral agency. 
  
Middle managers often do not succeed at infusing the organization with collective virtues, 
however, for which there are two main causes. First, top managers may bar them from 
participating in strategic conversations (Westley, 1990; cf. Proposition 4). Floyd and 
Wooldridge (1992, 1994) report that many top managers perceive it as their role to make 
strategic decisions, which leads them to exclude middle managers from all discussions apart 
from those on operational matters. Middle management’s attempts at furthering new 
initiatives, including the development of new virtues, often fall on deaf ears with top 
management. When middle managers lack the power to set norms, discuss them with 
subordinates, and sanction the latter according to their performance, moral development is 
bound to stagnate. A second cause for moral stagnation manifests itself when middle 
managers experience role conflict (Floyd and Lane, 2000) in their efforts to enhance the 
collective “goodness” of their organization (cf. Proposition 5). The middle-managerial 
responsibilities associated with the day-to-day operations of a business firm require a focus on 
the short to intermediate term, an emphasis on cost reduction, and the development of 
operational goals that are closely aligned with the deliberate strategy of the firm. In contrast, 
the development of collective virtues dictates a focus on the longer term, demands substantial 
investments, and calls for visionary goals that diverge from corporate orthodoxy. If middle 
management is not equipped to balance these competing responsibilities, the moral 
development of the organization will stagnate. As they remain in their utilitarian state, 
organizations will fail when the collective telos loses its appeal to some or all of their 
members (cf. Table 1). See Proposition 6. 
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Proposition 6: If middle managers are unable to promote the moral development of 
utilitarian organizations, these organizations will be dismantled as soon as their 
collective teloi lose their attractiveness in the eyes of their members. 
 
Goodness’ Payoff: The Consequences of Moral Community Status 
The link between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance 
(CFP) is a popular topic for empirical research in business ethics (Husted and De Jesus 
Salazar, 2006; McWilliams et al., 2006). Yet the empirical support for this link is mixed, as 
positive effects alternate with neutral and negative effects. Our model offers a new 
specification of the CSP-CFP association, suggesting that it is moderated by organizational 
type. We propose a contingency thesis which takes into account the so-called ‘double-edged 
sword’ mechanism (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). A core observation is that any decision by an 
external actor to contribute substantively to the increased effectiveness of an organization, 
either by endorsing its purpose or by making necessary resources available to it, is preceded 
by a social judgment (cf. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Through it, the actor determines 
whether an organization is worthy of support. But organizations who deliberately pursue 
activities to influence the decision-making processes of the actors upon whom they depend 
are at risk of being perceived as instrumental and manipulative (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). 
Nexus-of-contracts and utilitarian organizations are especially vulnerable in this respect, 
because they will by design only pursue activities that can be reconciled with their members’ 
goal of utility maximization. For these organizations, additional investments in CSP are likely 
to reduce the support they receive from their external constituents, leading to lesser 
performance. In contrast, we expect to see a positive CSP-CFP link for moral communities, 
since outsiders are more likely to perceive of these organizations’ CSP activities as part of 
their identity. Moral communities can thus count on an ‘authenticity bonus,’ which helps them 
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avoid the ‘double-edged sword’ mechanism. As this ‘bonus’ is unlikely to accrue to nexus-of-
contracts and utilitarian organizations, the latter are likely to be outperformed in substantive 
terms by moral communities. See Proposition 7.4
 
Proposition 7: Investments in CSP are more likely to furnish additional outside 
support for moral communities than for nexus-of-contracts or utilitarian organizations, 
as the latter parties’ efforts are more likely to be perceived as instrumental or 
insincere. 
 
The correlates of effectiveness – quality, efficiency, reliability – help organizations 
cope with technical environmental pressures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). But technical 
excellence does not guarantee success, as organizations must also cope with institutional 
pressures, although the strength of these varies across environments (Meyer and Scott, 1983). 
Institutional pressures manifest themselves as rule-like prescriptions concerning 
organizations’ structure and behavior, which emanate from regulative bodies, exemplary 
organizations, or the professions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). When organizations publicly 
demonstrate their conformity to these rules, they are enacting their own legitimacy, defined by 
Suchman as a “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (1995: 574). Most studies to date focus on the cognitive legitimacy of 
organizations (Mizruchi and Fein, 2000). This involves a sort of taken-for-grantedness, 
acquired as the organization mimics the structures or behaviors of highly visible or top-
performing organizations in its field, such that it “fades into the background” and escapes 
further scrutiny (Jepperson, 1991). A relatively underexplored – but potentially no less 
important – type is moral legitimacy, which rests on a positive normative evaluation of the 
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organization and its behaviors (Parsons, 1960). Moral legitimacy is attributed to an 
organization when outsiders, rather than judging the organization in terms of the contributions 
it makes to their narrow self-interests, assess it against a pro-social logic in which the good of 
the evaluator fuses with the good of society as a whole (Suchman, 1995). Arguably, seen 
through radically libertarian eyes, nexus-of-contracts firms and utilitarian organizations can 
be seen as morally legitimate creatures as long as they contribute to the advancement of the 
interests of the individuals partaking in them, irrespective of the consequences for social 
justice (cf. Nozick, 1979). As a matter of fact, however, the libertarian point of view has never 
gained a strong foothold in most liberal democracies. In most contemporary societies, it is 
common to hold firms accountable – albeit to varying degrees – for their performance on 
broader, more inclusive social criteria. Since the moral community is the only organizational 
type that functions according to this broader moral logic by design, it is more likely to furnish 
moral legitimacy than the other types. See Proposition 8. 
 
Proposition 8: Moral communities are more likely to be perceived as morally 
legitimate than nexus-of-contracts or utilitarian organizations. 
  
Collective moral agency is a self-sustaining quality in that it allows organizations to increase 
their effectiveness by avoiding the “double-edged sword” mechanism that might otherwise 
decrease the support of their outside audiences (cf. Proposition 7). It also allows them to 
evoke moral legitimacy, if they find a way to let their moral qualities carry over to outside 
audiences guided by a pro-social frame of mind (cf. Proposition 8). Moral communities are 
therefore able to fend off technical and institutional pressures, due to their control over the 
moral aspects of their behavior. But this does not make them immune to failure. Their 
Achilles’ heel is that their resilience depends on the sustained institutionalization of collective 
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virtues, which calls both for steady allocations of financial, human, and social capital towards 
their maintenance and for their constant reenactment in concrete organizational behaviors. 
Researchers of deinstitutionalization have argued that especially technical pressures can cause 
organizations to abandon such broadly endorsed practices (Oliver, 1992). When stagnant 
economic performance or lowered innovativeness forces organizations to rethink their current 
business practices, priorities can shift from the sustenance of collective virtues towards the 
adoption of new managerial fads that harbor the promise of greater productivity (Zuckerman, 
2000). Other researchers have found that technical pressures do not stand alone as antecedents 
of deinstitutionalization. Institutional pressures simultaneously shape the pace and process of 
deinstitutionalization (Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001). When evaluators switch from a pro-
social evaluation logic to a more narrowly self-centered one, for example, the institutional 
rationale behind maintaining collective virtues withers. See Proposition 9. 
 
Proposition 9: If moral community members are unable to fend off technical and 
institutional pressures urging the deinstitutionalization of collective virtues, their 
organization will lose its moral community status. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
A single research question has guided our efforts in this paper: What does it take to be a good 
company? In this concluding section we condense the arguments presented here into both a 
normative and a positive answer to this question. Furthermore, we discuss the implications of 
our analyses for practitioners, and reflect on how our efforts might impact the academic field 
of business ethics. 
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A Normative Take on Organizational Goodness 
Normatively, corporate goodness equals “moral goodness,” which is typically conceptualized 
in virtue ethics as the exercise of one’s virtues in accord with one’s purpose or telos. In a 
person-centered version of virtue ethics, such as Aristotle’s, this conception is unproblematic 
as all individuals are expected to pursue a single end, namely eudaimonia or “happiness.”5 
For Aristotle, all other ends are pursued because they are instrumental in obtaining others, but 
happiness is something “we always choose (…) for itself, and never for any other reason” 
(NE 1097b). Thus, eudaimonia alone is the only end we can “call final without any 
qualification” (NE 1097a). 
 Unfortunately, this singular conception of telos does not apply to the corporate world, 
as organizations are highly pliable instruments that can cater to practically any need. This 
renders it impossible to speak in general terms about organizational goodness. But we need 
not throw the baby out with the bathwater and commit ourselves to moral relativism. We 
object to a view of organizational goodness as something unique or idiosyncratic. To 
substantiate this point, we suggested a Mertonian theory of the middle-range which groups 
organizations in three classes according to their telos. Some organizations advance the private 
good of all parties partaking in them, and these nexus-of-contracts organizations are morally 
good as long as their members possess adequate self- and other regarding virtues. Other 
organizations advance some collective good for their members, and these utilitarian 
organizations are congruent to the extent that their members hold virtues of common pursuit. 
A final class of organizations is capable of pursuing intrinsically attractive collective goals, 
and such moral communities are morally good as long as they meet the boundary criteria for 
collective moral agency. Thus, the normative take on corporate goodness suggests that 
organizations are morally good as long as they possess virtues that are appropriate for the 
class of organizations to which they belong. 
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A Positive Take on Organizational Goodness 
When incorporated in positive theories of organizations, “goodness” is usually 
operationalized in terms of “practical excellence.” This second connotation raises the 
challenge of connecting notions of organizational virtue to practical outcomes like legitimacy 
and efficiency. We introduced a processual model of organizational development, which 
specifically draws attention to the differential roles played by top and middle managers in 
periods of organizational transition. Top managers are instrumental in developing nexus-of-
contracts organizations into utilitarian organizations. In the early stages of organizational 
development, they are the ones who must initially take the lead at infusing the organization as 
a whole with a sense of collective purpose, and its constitutive members with the virtues of 
common pursuit. If they succeed, their organizations will become morally more resilient, and 
more likely to survive periods in which organizational cohesion is threatened by increasingly 
attractive outside options for critical organizational participants.  
But at some point in organizational history, top managers must begin to involve 
middle managers in their strategic conversations. Once middle managers themselves 
transform from lethargic paladins to true “change masters” (Kanter, 1983), the organization 
becomes ready to develop from a utilitarian organization into a moral community. The 
success of this transformation is crucially dependent on middle managers’ efforts to help their 
organizations meet the boundary criteria for collective moral agency. Only middle managers 
can establish the necessary conditions of autonomy, alignability, and ability by encouraging 
lower-level organizational participants to commit collectively to a self-selected telos, by 
contributing to the resolution of organizational governance problems, and by developing the 
virtues necessary to realize the aforementioned telos. If successful, they can make the moral 
community resilient against moral failure, and lead it to unprecedented efficiency and 
legitimacy. 
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Implications for Managers, Consultants, and Policy Makers 
We see the practical value of our work primarily in the area of ethical diagnostics. Our model 
offers managers, consultants, and policy makers a new framework for analyzing corporate 
moral failure. In business ethics, explanations for ethical failure are usually of the so-called 
“bad apples/bad barrels” kind (Treviño, 1986; Treviño and Youngblood, 1990), implying that 
the cause of ethical problems is commonly traced either to unethical individuals (the “bad 
apples”) affecting the morals and motivations of those around them, or to ineffective 
organizational bureaucracies (the “bad barrels”) which corrupt even well-intending 
individuals by exposing them to dysfunctional informational cues and reward systems. 
Whereas these explanations are intuitively appealing, they are too simplistic to shed much 
light on complex cases of moral failure like the ENRON or WorldCom affairs. Our model 
offers a different take on the issue by stipulating two complementary paths leading to 
organizational moral demise. We label these paths moral stagnation and moral drift. 
Moral stagnation. All three organizational types harbor the promise of moral 
goodness, in the sense of them being capable of experiencing virtue-telos congruence. But 
whereas this type of congruence is relatively robust in moral communities, it is considerably 
frailer in utilitarian organizations and nexus-of-contracts organizations. Our argument is not 
that all organizations should strive to become moral communities, but if their goal is to 
become more robust against moral predicaments and to maximize their legitimacy and 
efficiency, this is still their best option. If top and middle managers refuse to direct their 
efforts towards this more institutionalized state of affairs, moral stagnation – a tendency 
towards inertia in an organizational form incapable of collective moral agency – is likely to 
set in. As a result, the morally stagnant organization will become more prone towards moral 
failure than its morally more advanced counterparts. Provided that a transparent informational 
regime is in place, moral stagnation should lead to a higher cost of external capital for 
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organizations, and to less willingness on behalf of outside constituents to contribute to long-
run organizational flourishing. 
Moral drift. Any temporary alignment between an organization’s telos and its pool of 
virtues, alas, offers no guarantees for future congruence. Without sufficient “maintenance 
work” by top and middle managers, all organizations are at risk of losing their state of 
virtuousness to moral drift – a dysfunctional developmental process resulting in a state of 
incongruence between an organization’s telos and its corresponding set of virtues. In the 
nexus-of-contracts organization, which’ virtues are fully reducible to those of its individual 
constituents, moral drift often takes the form of a crowding process. When members with a 
stock of self- and other regarding virtues that is sufficiently developed to allow them to stand 
their moral ground in the process of commerce are replaced by individuals with less self-
imposed restraint, nexus-of-contract organizations are bound for moral failure. In utilitarian 
organizations, moral drift occurs when the virtues of common pursuit are hollowed out from 
within – when top and middle managers do too little to maintain them, or from the outside – 
when the alternate options available to critical organizational constituents become too 
attractive to turn down. In the moral community, finally, moral drift occurs when the virtues 
that are crucial to collective moral agency are deinstitutionalized due to technical and 
institutional pressures on the organization and its members. 
 
Implications for Business Ethics and Management Scholars 
Rather than finishing our paper with the usual obligatory recommendations for future 
research, in which we would express the literally vain hope that future generations of business 
ethics and management scholars will spend their time and energy on conceptual refinement 
and empirical testing of our work, we close with a more general yet double call to arms for the 
fields of business ethics and management studies. First, we call upon scholars of both 
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denominations to return to the intellectual foundations of the ethics field by grounding their 
future work more firmly in the centuries-old traditions of ethical theory. In case any of our 
readers see any merit in either our typology or developmental model, much of the credit will 
have to go to prior contributors to virtue ethics, accompanied by the usual disclaimer. We not 
only find sufficient inspiration in classic works for contemporary contributions, but also that 
younger, domain-specific approaches like the stakeholder and corporate citizenship 
perspectives simply do not meet the standards of intellectual rigor set by centuries of 
scholarly debate. Second, we urge scholars to focus in particular on ethical theories that are 
most fully compatible with the domain of management studies. Other scholars may prove us 
wrong, but this congruence criterion seems to disqualify Kantian ethics and utilitarianism, 
respectively due to their overly forbidding stance towards many of the widely accepted means 
of goal-attainment in business and untenable assumption of agent-neutrality. Two ethical 
theories, however, are characterized by an exceptionally high degree of connectivity with the 
domain of management studies. One is contractualist business ethics, due to its base in the 
notion of content-independent commitment (cf. van Oosterhout et al., 2006); the other virtue 
ethics, due to its emphases on skills and excellence (cf. Heugens et al., 2006). If scholars are 
seriously willing to ground their work more strongly in either of these perspectives, we fully 
expect the fruits of their labor to reach higher standards of rigor and relevance. 
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TABLE 1 
Three Types of Normatively Good Organizations 
 Nexus of contracts Utilitarian 
organization 
Moral community 
Principle of 
association 
Accommodation Compromise Shared reasons 
Type of telos Individual utility 
maximization 
Collective utility 
maximization 
Self-selected 
collective goals  
Locus of the telos Individual Collective Collective 
Types of virtues Self- and other- 
regarding virtues 
Virtues of common 
pursuit 
Collective virtues 
Locus of the virtues Individual Individual Collective 
Virtue 
institutionalization 
Non-institutionalized Partially 
institutionalized 
Fully 
institutionalized 
Key success factors Maintaining a 
positive inducements 
contributions balance 
Keeping the 
collective telos 
attractive to all 
Continuous 
reinforcement of the 
organizational virtues
Likely cause of 
organizational 
failure 
Collective action 
problems  
Member turnover Deinstitutionalization 
of organizational 
virtues 
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FIGURE 1 
A Processual Model of Organizational Goodness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nexus of 
Contracts
Organizational
Failure
Organizational 
Legitimacy
Organizational
Effectiveness
Moral 
Community
Prospective
Contractors
Prospective
Contractors
Top Management’s 
Imprinting Role (P2)
Middle Management’s
Catalytic Role (P5)
Rational
Bargaining (P1)
Organizational
Failure
Top Management’s
Neglect Role (P3)
Good ethics
Is good business (P7)
Internal qualities carry 
over to the outside (P8)
De-institutionalization  
Of Virtue (P9)
Utilitarian
Organization
Leadership
Transition (P4)
Organizational
Failure
Middle Management’s
Stagnating Role (P6)
 39
ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 The figures and letters refer to the corresponding pages and columns (“a” is left, “b” is right) of 
Bekker’s (1831) Greek text of Aristotle’s combined works, which are regularly used for giving exact 
references to his writings. English translations are taken from the 1976 Penguin edition of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. 
2 We stress that we do not seek to develop a taxonomy (a classification of extant organizations) but a 
typology (a conceptual sensegiving device which highlights certain elements common to most cases of 
the typified phenomena). The three organizational types we sketch are ideal types (Weber, 1949) in 
that they portray congruence between their purpose and virtues. Yet, many real life organizations do 
not experience such congruence, and are therefore prone to moral defects. Thus, we neither imply that 
all organizations are morally good, nor that our typology encompasses an exhaustive set covering all 
extant organizations and organizational types. 
3 Velasquez (2003) of course acknowledges that organizations can be the bearer of properties that 
cannot be reduced to individual organizational members (538-541). 
4 Proposition 7 predicts that investments in CSP are likely to lead to greater effectiveness for moral 
communities relative to nexus-of-contracts and utilitarian organizations. The generalizability of this 
proposition is greater when investments have a positive opportunity cost, such that monies spent on 
legitimacy-enhancing activities like CSP ‘cannibalize’ on efficiency-enhancing activities like 
marketing and innovation. When there is no tradeoff, such that investments in CSP simultaneously 
make firms more efficient, the resulting legitimacy benefits for moral communities are less likely to 
result in strong effectiveness differentials vis-à-vis other organizational types. We thank JMS editor 
Steve Floyd for pointing this compensatory effect out to us.   
5 “Happiness” is the stock translation of eudaimonia, but the two words are not perfect synonyms. The 
latter also encompasses connotations of “success” or “accomplishment,” which are important for 
understanding the Aristotelian thesis as a whole and its applicability in the business context in 
particular. 
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